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THE PRINCIPLE OF SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF
STATES AS A BASIS FOR INTERNATIONAL
- ORGANIZATION
By HANS KELSENt
AT the historic conference held in Moscow in October, 1943, the Gov-
ernments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom, the
Soviet Union, and China jointly declared that they recognized "the neces-
sity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international
organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-
loving States, and open to membership by all such States, large and small,
for the maintenance of international peace and security." ' The extra-
ordinary importance of this statement for the fate of the world after this
war justifies the present attempt to examine the question whether the
principle of "sovereign equality" of States proclaimed by the Declaration
of Moscow can be the basis of an international organization ensuring a
lasting peace.
I.
The term "sovereign equality" used in the Four Power Declaration
probably means sovereignty and equality, two generally recognized char-
acteristics of the States as subjects of international law; for to speak of
"sovereign equality" is justified only insofar as both qualities are con-
sidered to be connected with each other. Frequently, the equality of states
is explained as a consequence of or as implied by their sovereignty.
What is the meaning of the ambiguous term "sovereignty" as used in
the Declaration? We may justifiably assume that in this declaration "sov-
ereignty," usually defined as "supreme authority," has a meaning not
incompatible with the existence of an international law which imposes
duties and confers rights upon States. For "ftle re-establishment of law
and order and the inauguration of a system of general security" are,
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according to the same Declaration, a war aim of the four States, and the
"law and order" to be reEstablished for the purpose of inaugurating a
system of general security can only be the Law of Nations, the interna-
tional legal order as a set of norms binding upon the States. If it is
premised that the States have duties imposed and, consequently, rights
conferred upon them by international law, they must be considered as sub-
jected to international law, but the figurative expression "to be subjected"
means only the relationship of subjects to a legal order which imposes
duties and confers rights upon them. Therefore, the sovereignty of the
States, as subjects of international law, is the legal authority of the States
under the authority of international law. If sovereignty means "supreme"
authority, the sovereignty of States as subjects of international law can
mean, not an absolutely but only a relatively supreme authority. A State's
legal authority may be said to be "supreme" insofar as it is not subjected
to the legal authority of any other State; and the State is then sovereign
when it is subjected only to international law, not to the national law of
any other State. Consequently, the State's sovereignty under international
law is its legal independence from other States. This legal independence
is the usual significance attributed to the term by writers on international
law.
Occasionally, sovereignty is also defined as supreme "power," and
under this definition power must mean the same as authority, legal power,
the competence of imposing duties and conferring rights. For if "power"
does not refer to the realm of norms or values, but to the realm of reality
determined by laws of causality, and means capability of producing an
effect, it is then easy to demonstrate that sovereignty as a supreme power
in this sense cannot be a characteristic of States as legal entities. For
States differ very much from each other with respect to their actual
power. Compared with and in relationship to a so-called Great Power,
a State like Lichtenstein has no power at all, although it is also called a
Power in diplomatic phraseology. If "power" means actual power, that
is, the capacity to bring about an effect, "supreme" power would, more-
over, mean to be a first cause, a prima causa, and, in this sense, only God
as the Creator of the world is sovereign. This concept of sovereignty in
terms of causality is a metaphysical, not a scientific one, derived from a
tendency to deify the State which inevitably leads to a political theory
which is rather a theology than a science of the State. Sovereignty in
the sense of international law can mean only the legal authority or com-
petence of a State limited and limitable only by international law and
not by the national law of another State.
The term "equality," designating an essential characteristic of the
States as subjects of international law, seems at first glance to signify
that all States have the same duties and the same rights. This statement,
however, is obviously not correct for the duties and rights established by
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international treaties constitute a great diversity among States. Conse-
quently, the statement must be restricted to general customary interna-
tional law. But even according to general customary international law,
all the States have not the same duties and rights. A littoral State, for
example, has other duties and rights than an inland State. The statement
must be further modified as follows: According to general international
law all the States have the same capacity of being charged with duties
and of acquiring rights; equality does not mean equality of duties and
rights, but rather equality of capacity for duties and rights. Equality is
the principle that under the same conditions States have the same duties
and the same rights. This is, however, an empty and insignificant for-
mula because it is applicable even in case of radical inequalities. Thus, a
rule of general international law conferring privileges on Great Powers
could be interpreted as in conformity with the principle of equality, if
formulated as follows: any State, on the condition that it is a Great
Power, enjoys the privileges concerned. The principle of equality so
formulated is but a tautological expression of the principle of legality,
that is, the principle that the general rules of law ought to be applied in
all cases in which, according to their contents, they ought to be applied.
Thus the principle of legal equality, if nothing but the empty principle
of legality, is compatible with any actual inequality.
It is, therefore, quite understandable that most of the writers on inter-
national law try to attribute a more substantial import to the concept of
equality. When characterizing the States as equal, they mean that accord-
ing to general international law no State can be legally bound without or
against its will. Consequently, they reason that international treaties are
binding merely upon the contracting States, and that the decision of an
international agency is not binding upon a State which is not represented
in the agency or whose representative has voted against the decision, thus
excluding the majority vote principle from the realm of international law.
Other applications of this principle of equality are the rules that no State
has jurisdiction over another State (and this means over the acts of
another State) without the latter's consent-par in parem not habet ju-
diciun-and that the courts of one State are not competent to question
the validity of the acts of another State insofar as those acts purport to
take effect within the sphere of validity of the latter State's national legal
order. Understood this way, the principle of equality is the principle
of autonomy of the States as subjects of international law.
According to traditional doctrine, the equality of the States in the sense
of autonomy is derivable from their sovereignty. Actually, however, it
is not possible to derive from the sovereignty of the State-that is, from
the principle that a State is subjected only to international law, not to the
national law of another State-the rules that no State can be legally
bound without or against its will, that international treaties are binding
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only upon the contracting States, that a State cannot be legally bound by
the decision of an international agency if it is not represented in this law
making body or if the State's representative has voted against the deci-
sion, that no State has jurisdiction over the acts of another State, and
so on. These rules may or may not be rules of positive international law
and the sovereignty of the States may be a consequence of these rules,
not the rules a consequence of sovereignty.
It is an illusion to believe that legal rules can be derived from a con-
cept such as sovereignty or any other legal concept. Legal rules are valid
only if they are created by legislation, custom, or treaty; and the legal
rules constituting the so-called equality of States are valid not because
the States are sovereign, but because these rules are norms of positive
international law. But these norms have, according to the same interna-
tional law, important exceptions. There are international treaties which,
according to general international law, impose duties upon third States,
as, for example, treaties establishing so-called international servitudes, or
treaties establishing a new State and at the same time imposing obliga-
tions upon it.2 There are cases where a State has jurisdiction over the
acts of another State without the latter's consent. By a treaty an inter-
national agency may be established in which only a part of the contract-
ing States are represented and which is authorized by the treaty to adopt
by majority vote norms binding upon all the contracting States. Such
a treaty is not incompatible with the concept of international law or with
the concept of the State as subject to international law; and such a
treaty is a true exception to the rule that no State can be legally bound
without or against its own will. The fact that the competence of the
international agency is based on the consent of all the States concerned
because the competence of the agency is the result of a treaty concluded
by all the States which may be bound by the majority decisions of the
agency, does not permit the conclusion that all the decisions of the agency
are adopted with the consent of all the States which are contracting par-
ties to the treaty and that, consequently, no decision is adopted without
or against the will of one of the States bound by the decision. This is
a fiction, which is in open contradiction to the fact that a State which is
not represented in the agency has in no way expressed its will with ref-
erence to the decision and that a State whose representative has voted
against the decision has expressly declared its opposite will.
The fact that a State has, by concluding the treaty, given its consent
to the competence of the agency established by the treaty is quite com-
patible with the fact that the State can change its will, expressed at the
conclusion of the treaty. This change of will is legally irrelevant, how-
ever, since the contracting State remains legally bound by the treaty, even
2. As, for example, Danzig or the Vatican State.
[Vol. 53 : 207
SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES
if it ceases to will what it declared to will at the moment it concluded the
treaty. Only at that moment is concordance of the wills of the contract-
ing States necessary in order to create the duties and rights established
by the treaty. The fact that the contracting State remains legally bound
by the treaty without regard to a unilateral change of will clearly proves
that a State can be bound even against its will and that the autonomy of
the State under international law is not, and cannot be, unlimited. The
will whose expression is an essential element of the conclusion of the
treaty is not at all the will which the State has, or has not, with respect
to the decision adopted by the agency established by the treaty.
Since it is undoubtedly possible that such a treaty can be concluded by
sovereign States on the basis of general international law, it is a misuse
of the concept of sovereignty to maintain that it is incompatible with
the sovereignty of the States to establish an agency endowed with the com-
petence to bind by a majority vote States represented or not represented
in the law-making body. This is not a logical impossibility, as is supposed
by those who base their arguments on the concept of sovereignty. What
is logically possible may, however, be politically undesirable. By a treaty
establishing an agency competent to adopt decisions binding upon the
contracting States that are not represented in the law making body or have
voted against the decision, the freedom of action of the contracting States
is certainly much more restricted than by any other treaty. Still the dif-
ference remains only a quantitative, not a qualitative one, since under
any legal order unlimited freedom of action is impossible. Moreover, by
the establishment of an agency endowed with true legislative power, an
international community is constituted which differs from any other inter-
national community, but only in the degree of its centralization. But this,
too, is a relative not an absolute difference because even this centralized
community is based on an international treaty and, consequently, has an
international character. It is not correct to say that such a community
because of its centralization is a State and ceases to be an international
community. There is no absolute border line between these two kinds of
communities, one of which is constituted by national, the other by inter-
national law, for there is no absolute difference between national and
international law; and national law can, upon occasion, arise from inter-
national law, as is the case when the constitution of a federal State is
established by an international treaty. Therefore, neither the fact that
a treaty establishing a legislative agency does very much restrict the free-
dom of action of the contracting States nor the fact that the commu-
nity constituted by such a treaty is more centralized than other interna-
tional communities usually are, justifies the argument that the establish-
ment of a legislative agency is incompatible with the nature of interna-
tional law or, what amounts to the same, with the sovereignty of the
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States. It may, however, be incompatible with the interest of the States,
whose governments .do not wish to be so much restricted in their free-
dom of action by a relatively centralized international organization, and,
therefore, refuse to conclude a treaty constituting such centralized com-
munity.
We can, of course, define sovereignty as we please and thus define it
in a way that submission to an agency endowed with legislative power is
incompatible with sovereignty. We can, however, derive from this con-
cept of sovereignty only what we have purposely put into its definition.
Consequently, the incompatibility derived from our definition means,
at bottom, that something is incompatible with our wishes. And it is
characteristic of jurists to present as logically impossible that which is
politically undesired because at variance with certain interests. The con-
cept of sovereignty has served this important function ever since the
French writer Jean Bodin introduced this idea into the theory of the State
in order to prove that the power of his king could not be restricted because
it was by its very nature "sovereign," and because sovereignty meant "the
absolute and perpetual power within a State." ' From this definition he
deduced the "rights" of sovereignty and secured to the doctrine its over-
whelming success.
II.
The declaration that the Powers of the Moscow Conference intend to
establish an international organization on the principle of "the sovereign
equality of all peace loving States" probably means that these Powers are
not willing to conclude a treaty constituting an international community
more centralized than such communities usually are. Clearly, it means
that the Governments concerned have not in view the establishment of an
international agency endowed with legislative or executive power, an
agency having the character of a true government. As far as the gov-
ernmental functions of the future international community are concerned,
we can hardly expect a more efficient competence than that which the
Covenant of the League of Nations conferred upon the Council and the
Assembly. Both were hampered by the principle of sovereign equality
carefully maintained by the Covenant- the principle that no State can
be bound without or against its will. Consequently, both agencies were
able to adopt decisions binding upon the members only by unanimous
vote and with the consent of the members not represented in the body.
It is superfluous to remind that these agencies did not and could not ful-
fill their task of guaranteeing the collective security, the peace of the
world, the task for which the League was erected. If this end is to be pur-
3. BoDIN, LEs Six Livis DE LA RtPUBLIQUE (Paris, 1576) 125.
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sued more successfully, but within the narrow limits of the principle of
"sovereign equality," the center of the international organization must,
then, not be placed in an agency which presents itself as its government
and which can be, in reality, only a sham government. The center of
gravity must be shifted to an agency whose functions are not paralyzed
by the principle of sovereign equality.
The only agency not so paralyzed is an international court. It is a fact
that the sole international organs whose procedure is not subjected to the
rule that no State can be legally bound without or against its will are
international tribunals. These agencies are competent to adopt decisions
by a majority vote, and their decisions are binding upon the States which
have established the tribunal by an international treaty. Nor are the
contracting States "represented" in the tribunal. For a person is legally
"represented" by another person if the latter is bound by the instructions
of the former; and an international judge in the true sense of the term
is, at least in principle, independent, particularly from the State by which
he has been appointed. To be appointed by an authority does not neces-
sarily imply to be subjected to that authority. And an international
"judge" does not "represent" the State by which he has been appointed,
in contradistinction to a member of an international government who,
indeed, "represents" the State which has appointed or delegated him, since
he has to carry out the instructions given to him by his State. A person
has the character of a "judge" only if he is not legally bound by instruc-
tions of the government which has appointed him. There are even inter-
national tribunals whose members are not or, at least partly not, appointed
by the States bound by the decisions of the tribunal, such as the Per-
manent Court of International Justice, whose members are elected by
the Council and the Assembly of the League of Nations, not by contest-
ing States, or a tribunal of arbitration composed equally of judges ap-
pointed by the contesting states and authorized to choose together a chair-
man or umpire.
Yet the establishment of an international tribunal composed of judges
not representing the contesting States and competent to adopt by major-
ity vote decisions binding upon the contesting States is generally con-
sidered compatible with the sovereignty and equality of the States. This
compatibility may be attributed to the idea that international tribunals
are competent only to apply positive international law to the disputes they
have to settle, and cannot impose by their decisions new obligations or
confer new rights upon the contesting States. It seems that the principle
of the sovereignty and equality of the States is maintained only for the
purpose of foreclosing the possibility that new obligations might be im-
posed upon an unwilling State (implying new rights of its opponent).
1944]
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III.
The League of Nations had not only a kind of government, the Coun-
cil and the Assembly, but also a tribunal, the Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice. This Court, however, was not placed at the center of
the League but, so to speak, at its periphery. For the members of the
League were not obliged to submit their disputes to the Court or to any
other tribunal. And the Permanent Court of International Justice estab-
lished according to Article 14 of the Covenant has no compulsory jurisdic-
tion. Even the so-called "optional compulsory" jurisdiction provided for
by Article 36 of the Statute of the Court is not compulsory jurisdiction
in the true sense of the term because the States are free to submit to this
jurisdiction or to submit merely for a certain period of time or only
with respect to certain disputes. In general, the members of the League
had the choice of submitting their disputes to the Court, to a special
tribunal of arbitration, or to the Council of the League; and tlie proced-
ure of the Council did not guarantee a peaceful settlement of all the dis-
putes brought before it. This agency was a political, not a judicial organ
and, consequently, in no respect fitted for that purpose. Nor did the Cove-
nant of the League of Nations exclude the possibility of disputes which
could not be settled in a peaceful way, and, consequently, the Covenant
could not exclude war as a means of settling disputes. The Briand-Kel-
logg Pact, which tried to do this, was doomed to failure from the moment
of its inception because it did not provide any obligatory procedure for
the peaceful settlement of disputes.
The only way to establish on the principle of "sovereign equality" an
international organization able to "maintain international peace and se-
curity" more efficiently than the League of Nations did, is the establish-
ment of an international community whose main organ is an interna-
tional court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction.4 This means that the
4. For many years the author has tried to show that the establishment of a court
with compulsory jurisdiction is the first and indispensable step to an effective reform
of international relations. See KELSEN, LAW AND PEACE IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
(1942) ; THE LEGAL PROCESS AND INTERNATIONAL ORDER (1934) ; Revision of the Cove-
iuant of the League of Nations in WORLD ORGANIZATION, A SYMPosIUM OF THE INSTI-
TUTE ON WORLD ORGANIZATION (1942) 392, Discussion of Professor Wliitehead's Paper
(1942) 75 PRoc. Am. AcAD. ARTS & SCIENCES 11; Essential Conditions of International
Justice in PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTY-FIFTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN So-
cIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (1941) 70, 77 et seq.; International Peace-by Court or
Governent? (1941) 46 A-m. J. Soc. 571. Since the outbreak of World War II,
the demand for an international court with compulsory jurisdiction as a means
for the maintenance of law and peace is supported in a steadily increasing degree by
American public opinion. The American Branch of the International Law Association,
the American Foreign Law Association, and the Federal Bar Association have adopted
the following Resolution: "1. That a primary war and peace objective of the United
Nations is the establishment and maintenance at the earliest possible moment of an
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members of the new League are obliged not to resort to war or reprisals
against each other, but to submit all their disputes ,:ithout any exception
to the decision of the court, and to execute the decisions and all the orders
of the court in good faith. It does not mean the establishment of a cen-
tralized executive power, for the decisions of the court are to be executed
against a reluctant State at the orders of the court (or an administrative
agency as an auxiliary organ of the court) by the armed forces of the
other members of the League. The establishment of a centralized execu-
tive power, a police force of the League, just as a central legislative organ,
is certainly not compatible with the principle of "sovereign equality" in
the sense of the term used by the Declaration of Moscow. Only the cen-
tralization of the judicial, not of the legislative or executive functions, is
the direction in which a real reform of interstate relations can be sought
within the limits laid down by the Moscow Conference for the future
international organization.
IV.
This proposition is based on the fact that the establishment of inter-
national courts competent to settle disputes by majority vote decisions,
binding upon States not represented in the court is actually considered
to be compatible with the sovereignty and equality of the States. But is
the statement still true if the court is endowed with compulsory jurisdic-
tion, if it is competent to decide all disputes without any exception, not
only so-called legal but also so-called political disputes? This question
must be answered in the negative if it is assumed that so-called political
conflicts are by their very nature not justiciable, so that they cannot be
settled by the decision of a court applying positive international law.
Political conflicts, in contradistinction to legal conflicts, are disputes in
which the parties, or at least one party, base their respective claims and
effective international peace among all nations based on law and the orderly administra-
tion of justice, and 2. That the administration of international justice requires the organi-
zation of a judicial system of interrelated permanent international courts with obligatory
jurisdiction. 3. That instrumentalities, agencies and procedures should be instituted and
developed to declare and make effective the considered will of the Community of Nations."
Somewhat similar resolutions were adopted by the House of Delegates of the American
Bar Association. The Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America (New
York), the National Catholic Welfare Conference (Washington), and the Synagogue
Council of America adopted a common Catholic, Jewish, and Protestant Declaration on
World Peace, Point 5 of which reads: "International institutions to maintain peace with
justice must be organized. An enduring peace requires the organization of international
institutions which will (a) develop a body of international law, (b) guarantee the faith-
ful fulfillment of international obligations, and revise then when necessary, (c) assure
collective security by drastic limitations and continuing control of armaments, compulsory
arbitration and adjudication of controversies, and the use when necessary of adequate
sanctions to enforce the law."
1944l
THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
the rejection of the other party's claim, not on a rule of positive inter-
national law but on Qther principles, such as justice and the like. A party
which bases its claim or its rejection of the other party's claim on other
factors than positive law does so because it considers positive law unsat-
isfactory. But a recognition of political conflicts as not justiciable is the
equivalent of a recognition that a State which in a certain case considers
positive international law unsatisfactory to its interests has a legitimate
reason for not submitting the case to the decision of a court applying
positive international law. And this implies admission that international
law is not binding upon a State if the latter does not recognize it as satis-
factory to its interests. Obviously, this admission is in contradiction to
the generally accepted principle that positive international law-such as
it actually is-is binding upon the States regardless of whether they con-
sider it satisfactory or not. And the doctrine that political conflicts, by
their very nature, cannot be decided by a judicial decision applying posi-
tive international law is presented merely for the purpose of disguising
this contradiction. While such a decision may be, from one viewpoint or
another, politically not desirable, it is logically possible. In any dispute
between two States, one State demands that the other behave in a cer-
tain way, and the other refuses to comply with the former's claim. The
application of positive international law to the dispute means the estab-
lishment of whether or not a rule of positive international law exists
obliging the State against which the claim is directed to behave in the
way claimed by the other State. If such a rule exists, the claim has to be
granted by the law applying agency; if no such rule exists, the claim has
ta be rejected. There is no third possibility. Any conflict is, therefore,
logically justiciable,5 and the doctrine of the unjusticiable character of
so-called political conflicts is merely another example of the fallacy of
declaring what is politically undesirable logically impossible.
Since it is possible to apply positive international law to so-called politi-
cal conflicts, the establishment of a court with compulsory jurisdiction to
which all disputes, so-called political conflicts included, must be submitted,
is not incompatible with the sovereignty and equality of the States insofar
as this incompatibility means that new obligations must not be imposed
upon States against their will. If the States are obliged to submit all
their disputes (political disputes included) to the decision of a court
applying positive law, the States are obliged to treat all their disputes as
legal disputes, just as the subjects of a State are obliged by national law
to treat all their conflicts as legal disputes. The establishment of com-
pulsory jurisdiction does not, therefore, abolish the sovereign equality
of the States in the sense in which the term is generally understood; it
merely puts an end to the possibility of settling a conflict by the employ-
5. See Kelsen, Compulsory Adjudication of International Disputes (1943) 37 Au.
J. INT. L. 397, 401 et seq.
[Vol. 53 : 207216
SOVEREIGN EQUALITY OF STATES
ment of force in case the law to be applied to this conflict is considered
by one or the other party to the conflict as not satisfactory to its inter-
ests. The establishment of compulsory adjudication of international
disputes is a means-perhaps the most effective means--of maintaining
positive international law.
It may be doubted, however, whether a court endowed with compulsory
jurisdiction always will apply only and exclusively positive international
law to the disputes submitted to its decisions, even though the court is not
expressly authorized by its statute to apply other norms. It is probable
that a court which has the power to decide all disputes without any excep-
tion will, in cases in which a strict application of positive law seems un-
satisfactory to the judges, adapt the positive law to their idea of justice
and equity. A new obligation may then be imposed and a new right con-
ferred upon the contesting States, and the establishment of a court with
compulsory jurisdiction may be considered incompatible with the sover-
eign equality of States, at least insofar as such a court does not apply
only and exclusively positive international law. It is difficult, moreover,
to prevent a court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction from applying
other norms than those of positive international law.
This is not a decisive argument against the compatibility of a court
exercising compulsory jurisdiction with the principle of sovereign equal-
ity. Insofar as an international tribunal creates new obligations by its
decisions, it does not differ fundamentally from ordinary tribunals restrict-
ed to the application of positive law. The view that the decisions of such
tribunals, though adopted according to tie principle of majority vote by
judges who are not exactly representatives of the States bound by the
decisions, are compatible with sovereignty and equality is based on the
idea that the application of positive law by a judicial decision has only
a declaratory, not a constitutive character, and that the application of
law differs essentially from the creation of law.
According to traditional doctrine, the law to be applied by the judicial
decision exists prior to the decision; this preexisting law is disputed only
in respect to the relationship between the parties to the conflict. The
dispute may refer to facts (questio facti) or to the law (questio juris),
that is, to the existence of a general rule of law or to its interpretation.
But a dispute referring to facts is also a dispute referring to law, al-
though it is not the existence or interpretation of a general rule of law
which is disputed; it is the applicability of this rule in the concrete case
which one party claims and the other party denies; and this means that
the individual norm, the concrete duty or right is disputed, which can,
or cannot, be derived from the general rule depending upon the existence
of the facts. Traditional doctrine maintains that a judicial decision apply-
ing positive law does not create law; it merely ends the dispute by estab-
lishing in an authoritative way the law valid for the case at hand.
1944]
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It transforms, so to speak, disputed law into undisputed and, finally, un-
disputable law by ascertaining the general or individual norm which,
though objectively existing, is subjectively disputed by the parties.
The mistake creeping into this doctrine consists in the failure to recog-
nize that the authoritative establishment of a disputed fact as well as a
disputed rule of law is not a merely declaratory, but a highly constitutive
act. In case a fact is disputed, the judicial decision which determines that
the fact has occurred in truth "creates" legally the fact and consequently
constitutes the applicability of the general rule of law referring to the
fact. In the sphere of law the fact "exists," even if in the sphere of nature
the fact has not occurred. If a court of last instance declares that an
individual has concluded with another individual a contract and has not
fulfilled it, or that an individual has committed murder, the disputed non-
fulfillment of contract or commission of murder are legal facts, even if,
in reality, the defendant has not concluded a contract nor the accused
committed mtirder. As a "legal" fact, that is as a fact to which the law
attaches certain consequences (duties or rights), the fact and, accord-
ingly, its consequences are "created" by the judicial decision; and it is
only as a legal fact that it has significance. In case a general rule of law
is disputed, because the existence or the meaning of the rule is doubtful,
the decision of the court interpreting the legal order or a special rule of
that order is not less creative than the authentic and final ascertainment
of a fact as the essential condition of the application of a general legal
rule. There is no absolute antagonism between application and creation
of law, since even a law applying act is at the same time a law creating act.
There is, to be sure, a certain difference between a judicial decision
applying an undisputed rule of positive law to a disputed fact or a dis-
puted rule of positive law to an undisputed fact, and a judicial decision
applying a new, that is, not pre xisting rule, thus alterihg existing law
and adapting it to changing circumstances. But the difference is not so
strongly marked as it seems to be, because the interpretation of positive
law, necessarily connected with every act of applying law, always implies
more or less an alteration of law. Ordinary national courts authorized
to interpret law and not to alter it always tend to bring about a gradual
evolution of the law. Consequently, the difference between an interna-
tional court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction and, therefore, more
inclined to adapt existing law to changing circumstances than other inter-
national tribunals, and an international court without compulsory juris-
diction is not so great that submission to the former could be refused
because of incompatibility with the principle of sovereign equality of
States. It is not the difference between courts with and courts without
compulsory jurisdiction which is decisive in respect to this principle. It
is the essential difference which exists between the slow and almost imper-
ceptible evolution of law through judicial decisions and the more or less
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drastic change of the law through legislative agencies, that is, organs
created for the sole purpose of substituting new for old law. This differ-
ence explains why submission to legislative organs, but not to courts, is
considered incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality. The
principle works as a protection against quick and relatively important
changes, not against any change of the law which, by its very nature, is
a dynamic, not a static, system.
A realistic examination of the actual administration of international
justice would disclose that the true reason for the generally accepted view
that submission to the decision of an international tribunal is not incom-
patible with the principle of sovereign equality is not so much the fact
that those tribunals cannot impose new obligations upon contesting States,
for this effect is almost unavoidable. It is rather the fact that judicial
decisions are objective and impartial, and that they are not political decrees
issued according to the principle that might goes before right, which is a
negaiion of law. It is the fact that judgments, even if not the strict appli-
cation of a preexisting legal rule, are based on the idea of law, that is,
on a rule which, although not yet positive law, should, according to the
conviction of independent judges, become law and really becomes posi-
tive law for the case settled by the judicial decision. It is the submission
to the law as a body of slowly and steadily changing norms which is not
incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality, since it is only this
law that guarantees the coexistence of the States as sovereign and equal
communities.'
It is, therefore, not too optimistic, perhaps, to expect that within the
international organization to be established, according to the Moscow
Declaration, for the maintenance of international peace and security a
court endowed with compulsory jurisdiction may be instituted. Such a
court or system of interrelated international courts endowed with compul-
6. A court with compulsory jurisdiction was the object of the Convention for the
Establishment of a Central American Court of Justice, signed on December 20, 1907, at
Washington, by the Governments of the Republics of Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras,
Nicaragua, and Salvador. Article I of the Convention reads: "The High Contracting
Parties agree by the present Convention to constitute and maintain a permanent tribunal
which shall be called the 'Central American Court of Justice,' to which they bind them-
selves to submit all controversies or questions which may arise among them, of whatso-
ever nature and no matter what their origin may be, in case the respective Departments
of Foreign Affairs should not have been able to reach an understanding." According to
the preamble the Convention w.-as concluded by the contracting States "for the purpose
of efficaciously guaranteeing their rights and maintaining peace and harmony inalterably
in their relations, without being obliged to resort in any case to the employment of
force." Submission to the compulsory jurisdiction of the court vas not only considered
as compatible vith the sovereignty and equality of the contracting States, but a means
of guaranteeing their rights as sovereign and equal subjects of international law. The
Convention was concluded only for ten years. The court came to an end in 1918.
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sory jurisdiction, even if not combined with a centralized executive power
and a police force, would constitute the first indispensable step toward a
real pacification of the international community. If, however, this hope
is, indeed, too optimistic, if it shall be impossible to realize this minimum
of centralization because it will be considered as incompatible with the
"sovereign equality of all peace loving States," there will, then, be no
hope at all for a real improvement of international relations, and the
peace organized by those States will prove to be nothing more than a
short armistice between this and another world war.
